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Introduction
There is an intense public and policy debate over whether EU Structural and 
Cohesion Funds (henceforth EU Funds) contribute to lower levels of corrup-
tion and better governance or conversely fuel government favouritism and 
erode institutional quality. This debate is fed by striking negative examples: 
the Italian mafia hijacking highway projects, or the European Commission 
freezing Structural Funds payments in countries such as Romania, Bulgaria 
and Hungary. Some of these examples suggest the involvement of high-level 
politics and organised criminal groups, raising the possibility that the EU in 
fact extensively finances large-scale corruption in a number of countries. As 
EU Funds constitute a considerable proportion of GDP in many member states, 
especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) where they amount to between 
1.9 per cent and 4.4 per cent of annual member state GDPs (KPMG, 2012) and 
well above 50 per cent of public investment, this debate is crucial for the future 
of the EU and its territorial cohesion as well as the quality of institutions across 
Europe more broadly.
However, there has been little academic research on this topic, which deprives 
policymakers of crucial evidence underpinning future policy decisions. In order 
to address this gap in the evidence base, this chapter sets out to assess system-
atically the impact of EU Funds spending on institutionalised grand corruption 
risks across the whole EU. The chapter focuses on the 27 EU member states with 
sufficiently sizeable public procurement spending funded by the EU – that is, 
the EU28 countries except for Malta1 – over the 2009–14 period. EU Funds are 
spent in various ways that make it impossible to arrive at a blanket assessment of 
their impact on corruption. We look specifically at public procurement spending 
by public or semi-public organisations (i.e. state-owned enterprises) financed 
from EU Funds, which predominantly means the use of Cohesion and Structural 
Funds. This approach has the advantage that we can compare projects that are 
similar in most respects except for the source of financing: predominantly EU 
or predominantly national. Moreover, there is exceptionally good comparative 
data available on large public procurement tenders in all countries at the level 
of individual contracts. Our approach is a major departure from prior studies 
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in this area, as it utilises a large-scale micro-level quantitative database, which 
allows us to paint a detailed picture of mechanisms at the analytical level where 
corruption takes place, while also being broad enough to evaluate whole systems 
of governance.
Theory
In spite of the considerable public and policy interest in corruption risks in EU 
Funds spending, there has been remarkably little scientific research conducted 
into the question to date (Dimulescu et al., 2013; Beblavy and Sičáková-Beblavá, 
2014; Fazekas et al., 2014). There are, however, two bodies of literature that 
speak to this issue: the political science literature on aid dependence and the 
Europeanisation literature in political science.
The literature looking at the effect of development aid on quality of institu-
tions, and corruption is extensive. It can only suggest the main mechanisms at 
play, as EU Funds are spent in Europe in very different institutional contexts 
and funding volumes than development aid is spent in developing countries. 
Nevertheless, according to this literature, foreign aid can have a positive effect 
on governance by providing clear policy goals such as improving the civil service 
and helping countries to overcome the lack of resources for state-building (Knack, 
2001). However, development aid can also destroy institutions and impede state-
building in much the same way that natural resources can (Djankov et al., 2008). 
It can weaken accountability and the development of civil society by breaking the 
link between domestic revenues (i.e. taxation) and government services. It can 
also damage administrative capacity in three ways:
1 reallocating talented bureaucrats from domestic institutions to aid organisations;
2 providing additional organisational goals that undermine institutional cohesion; 
and
3 increasing the pool of public resources available for rent-seeking, which easily 
translates into additional corruption in contexts with weak administrative 
capacity (Bräutigam, 2000).
Meanwhile, the Europeanisation literature presents three good reasons for believing 
that EU Funds support good government:
1 One of the most important remaining post-accession levers that Brussels has 
at its disposal for disciplining new member states is EU Funds and the threat 
of withdrawing them (Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2009). This should motivate 
recipient countries to manage funds to a high EU standard, if needed, even 
better than national funds.
2 The disbursement of EU Funds is more heavily regulated, making corruption 
more costly and motivating recipient organisations to invest in administrative 
capacity.
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3 Extensive monitoring of and controls on EU Funds in addition to the national 
audit frameworks (for example, OLAF or the European Court of Justice) 
make the detection and punishment of corruption more likely than in projects 
funded with domestic funds (European Commission, 2003; European Court 
of Auditors, 2012, 2013).
However, there are also three arguments in the Europeanisation literature that 
external funding such as EU Funds damages the quality of government and increases 
corruption:
1 EU Cohesion and Structural Funds are spent on investment projects where 
public officials have wide discretion (for example, project design and budget-
ing). From the wider literature, it is clear that discretionary spending is more 
likely to involve corruption than non-discretionary spending such as pensions 
(Mauro, 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2001).
2 EU funding provides a large additional pool of public resources for rent 
extraction, which is in effect unlimited as most recipient countries struggle to 
draw 100 per cent of allocated funds (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013).
3 EU Funds, like any external funding, weaken the link between domestic civil 
society, taxation and policy performance.
In the context of public procurement, ‘institutionalised grand corruption’ refers 
to the allocation and performance of public procurement contracts by bending 
prior explicit rules and principles of good public procurement in order to benefit 
a closed network while denying access to all others (World Bank, 2009; Fazekas 
et al., 2014).
From the above discussion, the following null hypothesis results:
H0: EU Funds decrease institutionalised grand corruption across the EU.
The above discussion also suggests that in countries and regions with diverse 
institutional quality, the effect may also differ due to the relative strength of each 
causal mechanism linking EU Funds to public procurement corruption. While no 
systematic analysis of determinants is presented due to lack of space, it is sug-
gested that more corrupt countries and regions are less willing to cooperate with 
EU authorities and more prone to rent-seeking, which tips the balance towards 
more corruption in EU Funds.
Data and variables
Data used
The database we used, Tenders Electronic Daily (henceforth TED), derives from 
public procurement announcements of the 2009–14 period in the EU27 countries 
(i.e. the EU28 countries minus Malta) and is the online version of the Supplement 
Corruption in EU Funds? 189
to the Official Journal of the European Union, dedicated to EU public procurement 
(DG GROWTH, 2015). TED is a comprehensive database containing details of 
all public procurement procedures conducted under the EU Public Procurement 
Directive – that is, all contracts exceeding set contract value thresholds (for example, 
€135,000 for services and goods contracts). The database was released by the 
European Commission, which has also conducted a series of data quality checks 
and enhancements. TED contains variables appearing in both calls for tenders and 
contract award notices, which provide a rich picture of the procurement process 
up until contract award by disclosing contract values, the number of bidders, the 
names of the winning firm and the deadline for submission, to name only a few 
key variables available.2 Each country’s public procurement legislation operates 
within the framework of the EU Public Procurement Directive and so the legisla-
tion of different countries is therefore, by and large, comparable. TED contains 
the details of over 2.8 million contracts for the 27 EU member states considered.
Variables used in the analysis
Use of EU Funds
The spending of EU Funds in public procurement can be directly identified in each 
contract award announcement, which records the use or non-use of EU Funds 
along with reference to the corresponding EU programme. However, no infor-
mation is published as to the proportion of EU funding within the total contract 
value. Hence, we had to employ a yes/no categorisation of each contract awarded. 
Public procurement from EU Funds falls under the same procurement rules and 
thresholds as other funding sources. Common national and EU legal frameworks 
for public procurement warrant a meaningful comparison between EU-funded and 
non-EU-funded public procurement procedures. The crucial difference between 
contracts funded from EU Funds and those funded by national governments lies in 
the additional monitoring and controls and different motivation structures associ-
ated with spending EU Funds. While the use of EU Funds differs greatly between 
countries, there are a large number of observations for matching contracts in each 
case (see Table 13.A1 in the Appendix). The full database used for this analysis 
can be downloaded at digiwhist.eu/resources/data.
Indicators of institutionalised grand corruption
Developing comparative indicators of institutionalised grand corruption in 
public procurement for all EU27 countries represents the primary methodologi-
cal innovation of this chapter. The approach follows closely the corruption risk 
measurement methodology developed by the authors in that it makes use of a 
wide range of public procurement ‘red flags’ (Fazekas et al., 2014, forthcoming; 
Charron et al., 2015).
The measurement approach exploits the fact that for institutionalised grand 
corruption to work, procurement contracts have to be awarded recurrently to 
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companies belonging to the corrupt network. This can only be achieved if legally 
prescribed rules of competition and openness are circumvented. By implication, it 
is possible to identify both the input side of the corruption process (i.e. fixing the 
procedural rules for limiting competition) and also the output side (i.e. signs of 
limited competition). By measuring the degree of unfair restriction of competition 
in public procurement, a proxy indicator of corruption can be obtained.
First, the simplest indication of restricted competition in line with our theo-
retical definition is when only one bid is submitted for a tender in an otherwise 
competitive market, which typically allows for awarding contracts above market 
prices and extracting corrupt rents (output side). Hence, single-bidder contracts as 
a percentage of all of the awarded contracts is the most straightforward measure 
we used.
Second, a more complex indication of high-level corruption also incorporates 
characteristics of the tendering procedure that are in the hands of public officials 
who conduct the tender and suggests deliberate competition restriction (input 
side) (Fazekas et al., 2013). This composite indicator, which we call the cor-
ruption risk index (CRI), represents the probability of corrupt contract award in 
public procurement, defined as follows:
CRIi = Σj wj * CIj i  (13.1)
Σj wj = 1 (13.2)
0 ≤ CRIi ≤ 1 (13.3)
0 ≤ CIj
i ≤ 1 (13.4)
where CRIi stands for the corruption risk index of contract i, CIji represents 
the jth elementary corruption indicator observed in the tender of contract i and 
wj represents the weight of elementary corruption indicator j. Elementary cor-
ruption indicators can be either corruption inputs or outputs. CRI = 0 indicates 
minimum corruption risk, while CRI = 1 denotes maximum corruption risk 
observed. Based on qualitative interviews about corruption in the public pro-
curement process, a review of the literature (OECD, 2007; World Bank, 2009; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013) and regression analysis, we identified the follow-
ing five components of the CRI in addition to single bidding (Table 13.1):
1 A simple way to fix tenders is to avoid the publication of the call for tenders 
in the official public procurement journal, as this makes it harder for competi-
tors to prepare a bid. This is only considered in non-open procedures, as in 
open procedures publication is mandatory.
2 While open competition is relatively hard to avoid in some tendering proce-
dure types such as open tender, others such as invitation tenders are by default 
much less competitive; hence using less open and transparent procedure types 
can indicate the deliberate limitation of competition, hence corruption risks.
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3 If the advertisement period (i.e. the number of days between publishing the 
call for tenders and the submission deadline) is too short to allow for the 
preparation of an adequate bid, it can serve corrupt purposes, whereby 
the issuer informally tells the well-connected company about the opportunity 
well in advance.
4 Different types of evaluation criteria are prone to manipulation to different 
degrees; subjective, hard-to-quantify criteria often accompany rigged assess-
ment procedures as they create room for discretion and limit accountability 
mechanisms.
5 If the time taken to decide on the submitted bids is excessively short or 
lengthened by legal challenge, it can also signal corruption risks. Snap 
decisions may reflect premediated assessment, while legal challenge and 
the correspondingly lengthy decision period suggests outright violation of 
laws.
For continuous variables above such as the length of the advertisement period, 
thresholds had to be identified in order to reflect the non-linear character of cor-
ruption. This is because most values of continuous variables can be considered 
as reflections of diverse market practices, while some sets of outlier values are 
more likely associated with corruption. Thresholds were identified using regres-
sion analysis, in particular analysing residual distributions (for more on this, see 
Fazekas et al., forthcoming).
Table 13.1 Summary of elementary corruption risk indicators.
Procedural 
phase
Indicator name Indicator values
Submission Call for tenders 
publication
0 = call for tender published in official journal 
1 = NO call for tender published in official 
journal
Procedure type 0 = open procedure types
1 = non-open procedure types (e.g. accelerated 
restricted procedure)
Length of submission 
period
Number of days between publication of call for 
tenders and submission deadline (for short 
submission periods, weekends are deducted)
Assessment Weight of non-price 
evaluation criteria
Sum of weights for evaluation criteria that are 
NOT related to prices
Length of decision 
period
Number of days between submission deadline 
and contract award announcement
Outcome Single bidder contract 
(valid/received)
0 = more than 1 bid received 
1 = only 1 bid received
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We restricted the sample in two ways:
1 Competitive markets: We only examined tenders in markets with at least ten 
contracts awarded during the 2009–14 period, where markets are defined by 
product type (CPV3 level 3) and location (NUTS4 level 1) within each country.
2 Regulated tenders: We only used those tenders that are above EU thresh-
olds in order to avoid the noise of contracts that are too small and voluntary 
reporting, which follows erratic patterns across countries and over time.
These together removed 17 per cent of the observations.
In addition to the identification of thresholds in continuous variables, regres-
sion analysis was also used to identify ‘red flags’ which are most likely to signal 
corruption rather than any other phenomena such as low administrative capacity. 
Ultimately, those variables and variable categories that were selected are large 
and significant predictors of single-bidder contracts. The regression set-up con-
trolled for four likely confounders of bidder numbers:
1 institutional endowments measured by type of issuer (for example, municipal 
or national);
2 product market and technological specificities measured by CPV division of 
products procured;
3 contract size (log contract value in euros);
4 regulatory changes as proxied by year of contract award.
The logic of regression analysis is as follows. If, in a certain country, not publish-
ing the call for tenders in the official journal for open procedures is associated 
with a higher probability of a single-bidder contract award, it is likely that avoid-
ing the transparent and easily accessible publication of a new tender is typically 
used for limiting competition. This would imply that a call for tenders not pub-
lished in the official journal becomes part of the analysed country’s CRI. Taking 
another example, if we found that leaving only 5 or fewer days for bidders to 
submit their bids is associated with a higher probability of a single-bidder contract 
award compared to periods longer than 20 calendar days (a more or less arbitrary 
benchmark category), this would indicate that extremely short advertisement peri-
ods are often used for limiting competition. This would then provide sufficient 
grounds to include the ‘Five or fewer days’ category of the decision period vari-
able in the CRI of the country in question. Following this logic, in addition to the 
outcome variable in these regressions (single-bidder), only those variables and 
variable categories that are in line with a rent extraction logic and proven to be 
significant and powerful predictors were included in the CRI.
 Once the list of elementary corruption risk indicators was determined with 
the help of the above regressions, each of the variables and variable categories 
received a component weight. As we lacked the detailed knowledge of which ele-
mentary corruption technique is a necessary or sufficient condition for corruption 
to occur, we assigned equal weight to each variable and the sizes of regression 
coefficients were only used to determine the weights of categories within variables. 
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For example, if there were four significant categories of a variable, then they 
would get weights 1, 0.75, 0.5 and 0.25, reflecting category ranking according to 
coefficient size. The component weights were normed so that the observed CRI 
fell between 0 and 1.
Each of the two corruption risk indicators has its pros and cons. The strength 
of the single-bidder indicator is that it is very simple and straightforward to 
interpret. However, it is also more prone to gaming by corrupt actors due to its 
simplicity. The strength of the CRI is that while individual strategies of corrup-
tion may change as the environment changes, they are likely to be replaced by 
other techniques. Therefore, the composite indicator is a more robust proxy of 
corruption over time than a single-variable approach. In an international com-
parative perspective, a further strength of the CRI is that it balances national 
specificities with international comparability by allowing for the exact formula-
tion of the components to vary, thereby reflecting differences in local market 
conditions. The main weakness of the CRI is that it can only capture a subset of 
corruption strategies in public procurement, arguably the simplest ones; hence 
it misses out on sophisticated types of corruption such as corruption combined 
with inter-bidder collusion.
Validity of corruption risk indicators
While the validity of both corruption risk measures predominantly stems from 
their direct fit with the definition of high-level corruption in public procurement, 
it is also underpinned by their association with widely used survey-based macro-
level corruption indicators as well as with further micro-level objective indicators 
of corruption risks.
Both corruption risk indicators (2009–14 averages per NUTS region using the 
number of nationally funded contracts) correlated as expected with the regional 
European Quality of Institutions index, population corruption perceptions and 
self-reported bribery of the same regional representative survey of 2013 (Charron 
et al., 2010) (Table 13.2).
Table 13.2  Bivariate Pearson correlation between ‘objective’ measures of regional 
corruption and survey-based indicators for NUTS2 regions that awarded at 
least five contracts in the 2009–14 period.
Variable % single-bidder contracts Regional CRI N
% single-bidder contracts 0.51* 178
Regional CRI 0.51* 178
EQI (2013) −0.41* −0.11 171
Corruption perception 0.34* 0.12 172
Reported bribery 0.34* 0.20* 172
Source: TED and Charron et al. (2015).
Note: * = significant at the 5% level.
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Figure 13.1  Bivariate relationship between WGI-Control of Corruption (2013 point 
estimate) and the CRI and the share of single-bidder contracts (2009–13 
period averages).
Source: TED and Kaufmann et al. (2010).
At the national level, one simple indication that the corruption indices were 
valid was their association with widely acknowledged and used corruption indices 
such as the World Bank’s Control of Corruption indicator (Figure 13.1: top panel 
for the CRI, bottom panel for the share of single-bidder contracts). While validity 
tests were confirmatory in both cases, the association was much stronger for the 
single-bidder indicator than for the CRI.
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Figure 13.2  Average corruption risks of public procurement suppliers registered abroad, 
EU26, 2009–14 (Ncontract = 27,888).
Source: TED
Note: We excluded Croatia and Malta due to the small number of observations.
In addition to macro-level evidence of validity, two micro-level ‘objective’ 
risk indicators were inspected for further testing validity: procurement suppliers’ 
country of origin and contract prices. It was expected that contracts that carry 
a higher corruption risk are won by companies registered in tax havens as their 
secrecy allows for hiding illicit money flows (Shaxson and Christensen, 2014). 
In line with our expectations, there was a marked and significant difference with 
regards to both indicators (Figure 13.2).
We also expected corruption to drive prices up. A simplistic, albeit widely 
used, indicator of price in the absence of reliable unit prices is the ratio of actual 
contract value to initially estimated contract value (Coviello and Mariniello, 
2014). As expected, both the single-bidder indicator and the CRI were associated 
with a higher price ratio. Single-bidder contracts were associated with a 9 per cent 
higher contract value, while contracts with one unit higher CRI were associated 
with a 17 per cent higher contract value (Table 13.3).
Results
In the absence of random assignment of EU funding, the causal effect of EU 
Funds on corruption risks was estimated by matching tenders without EU fund-
ing (control group) with tenders funded by EU Funds (treatment group) and 
comparing the two groups in terms of corruption risks, measured by the CRI 
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Table 13.3 Linear regression explaining relative contract value, EU27, 2009–14.
Dependent variable Relative contract value (contract price/estimated price)
Independent variables
Single-bidder contract 0.092
CRI 0.173
Sign. 0.000 0.000
Each regression contains constant
Controls: sector of contracting entity, type of contracting entity, year of contract award, 
country of contract award, main product market of procured goods and services, 
contract value
N 543,355 543,355
R2 0.143 0.115
Source: TED.
and the single-bidder share. Comparing tenders that were as similar as possible 
in every relevant respect except funding source allowed for the identification 
of a causal impact of EU Funds on corruption risks. The obvious limitation of 
this approach was that we could not measure all of the confounding factors; 
hence we could not fully account for all of the systematic differences between 
EU-funded and nationally funded contracts that contribute to corruption risks. 
We used state-of-the-art matching methods that are widely employed in the 
programme evaluation literature (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).
Matching is superior to the simple, unmatched comparison of group means 
as long as the selection of EU-funded projects is itself not driven by corrupt 
considerations such as deliberately channelling EU Funds to markets where hid-
ing corruption is easier. If the selection is predominantly strategic, driven by 
corruption, the simple comparison is more appropriate than matching. As it is 
unclear to what degree EU Funds selection is driven by corrupt considerations, 
we considered the matched results as a lower-bound estimate and the simple 
comparison as an upper-bound estimate of the causal impact.
A simple, unmatched comparison of the average single-bidder share and the 
CRI suggested that EU-funded procurement carries higher corruption risks than 
nationally funded procurement across the whole of the EU (Tables 13.4 and 
13.5). These effects are substantial: increases of 38 per cent and 16 per cent for 
the single bidder share and the CRI respectively compared to nationally funded 
contracts.
In order to balance the different composition of EU-funded and nationally 
funded contracts, we employed a propensity score-matching algorithm7 that 
matched contracts on control variables.8 The corruption risks of any contract 
are determined on the one hand by the characteristics of the contract itself (for 
example, the type of service or goods procured, such as a consultancy report) 
and on the other, by the institutional environment in which it is awarded (for 
example, weaker control institutions in a country). Both of these had to be 
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Table 13.4  Unmatched and matched comparisons of EU-funded and non-EU-funded 
contracts’ single-bidder share, EU275 totals, 2009–14.
 Unmatched 
comparison
Propensity 
score-matching 
(cross-country)
Propensity 
score-matching 
(within-country)
Non-EU-funded 0.247 0.242 0.281
EU-funded 0.340 0.340 0.338
Diff. (EU-funded −  
non-EU-funded)
0.093 0.098 0.057
95% conf. interval – lower bound 0.091 0.094 0.054
95% conf. interval – upper bound 0.096 0.101 0.061
N non-EU-funded 1,407,301 123,678 121,338
N EU-funded 123,696 123,696 121,338
Source: TED.
Table 13.5  Unmatched and matched comparisons of EU-funded and non-EU-funded 
contracts’ CRI, EU276 totals, 2009–14.
 Unmatched 
comparison
Propensity 
score-matching 
(cross-country)
Propensity 
score-matching 
(within-country)
Non-EU-funded 0.225 0.260 0.254
EU-funded 0.262 0.262 0.261
Diff. (EU-funded −  
non-EU-funded)
0.037 0.003 0.008
95% conf. interval – lower bound 0.036 0.001 0.006
95% conf. interval – upper bound 0.038 0.004 0.009
N non-EU-funded 1,407,300 123,678 121,338
N EU-funded 123,696 123,696 121,338
Source: TED.
controlled for in the matching process to arrive at a balanced comparison. In terms 
of characteristics of contracts matched, the following five variables were used:
 • the main market of procured goods and services (using CPV two-digit cat-
egorisation once again);
 • the log value of the contract;
 • the year of contract award;
 • the type of procuring organisation (for example, local body or public utility);
 • the main sector in which the procuring organisation operates (e.g. education, 
healthcare).
In terms of institutional characteristics, we controlled for the country in which 
the contracting authority resides, which captures the macro-institutional factors 
determining corruption risks. This was done in two alternative ways:
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1 We allowed for a degree of flexibility where some contracts could be matched 
to a contract in another country as long as it improved matching on contract-
level characteristics (cross-country matching).
2 We restricted matching only to contracts in the same country at the expense 
of poorer matching on contract-level characteristics and in fact removing 
some EU-funded contracts due to a lack of sufficient matches (within-country 
matching).
While these two variants did not deliver substantially different results, the more 
restrictive approach is preferable as national-level effects are likely to override 
contract-level effects. Tables and Figures demonstrating the quality of matching 
procedures can be found in the Appendix.
The propensity score-matching procedures, taking into account confounding 
factors, revealed a similar picture to the unmatched comparison, although effect 
magnitudes change somewhat, in particular for CRI comparisons. For the single- 
bidder indicator, the cross-country propensity score-matching resulted in a simi-
larly strong effect (0.1), while the within-country propensity score-matching 
delivered a slightly smaller effect (0.06) (Table 13.4). Both of these effects are 
substantial in relative terms: they indicate that corruption risks would have been 
20–40 per cent lower had the same contracts been financed from national funds 
rather than EU Funds.
For the CRI, both propensity score-matching algorithms delivered a substan-
tially smaller effect size than the simple comparison: the cross-country matching 
showed an increase of corruption risks due to EU Funds of 0.003, while the 
within-country matching resulted in a somewhat larger effect (0.01) (Table 13.5). 
Both of these effects are small in relative terms: they indicate that corruption risks 
would have been 1–3 per cent lower had the same contracts been financed from 
national funds rather than EU Funds.
In sum, for all of the specifications, the negative effect of EU funding on 
corruption risks (i.e. worsening corruption) stayed by and large the same. The 
stronger negative effect when measuring corruption risks by the single-bidder 
share rather than by the CRI is in line with prior research looking at CEE national 
datasets (Fazekas et al., 2014). This suggests that it is market outcomes that are 
particularly negatively influenced by EU funding, whereas formal requirements 
such as the use of open procedure or publishing the call for tenders are more 
positively influenced.
It must be noted that a large portion of the control group was discarded in order 
to achieve a tight comparison between treatment and control groups, while even 
some EU-funded contracts were excluded by the within-country propensity score-
matching algorithm, as no sufficiently close match was found. Missing values of 
control variables were included as separate values in each matching algorithm; 
however, due to their large numbers in some countries, they may have influ-
enced the reliability of the results in ways that are not clear. As data quality is best for 
the biggest beneficiaries of EU funding, such bias is expected to be minor. For 
the EU-wide average effect, we did not apply any country weights; hence each 
Corruption in EU Funds? 199
country contributed to the overall mean in proportion to the number of EU-funded 
contracts it has been awarded. This made the performance of the Polish EU fund-
ing system the single most important factor in determining the overall EU mean as 
Polish EU-funded contracts make up roughly one-third of all EU-funded contracts 
in the database.
Based on these results, we can reject H0 – that is, the moderating effect of 
EU Funds on grand corruption in public procurement across the whole EU. 
EU-funded public procurement contracts carry a greater risk of corruption than 
domestically funded ones whether or not tenders’ characteristics are matched. 
The different effect magnitudes given by using the single-bidder share and the 
CRI indicate the different effect of EU Funds on the outcomes of competition 
and the characteristics of the contracting process. This is hardly a surprise given 
the predominant focus of EU monitoring on bureaucratic inputs rather than 
competitive outcomes.
The change in effect magnitude when controlling for confounding factors 
highlights that the contexts in which EU Funds are spent exercise a consider-
able impact on corruption risks. In order to directly explore this variability at 
the national level, EU-funded and nationally funded contracts’ shares of single 
bidders were plotted by country (Figure 13.3). It is apparent that most coun-
tries cluster around the line representing parity between corruption risks in 
EU-funded and nationally funded public procurement, though there are some 
Figure 13.3  Single-bidder shares of EU-funded and nationally funded public 
procurement contracts by country, EU26,9 2009–14 (applying within-
country matching).
Source: TED.
Note: The dashed line indicates where the single-bidder shares are equal in EU-funded and national 
funded contracts. We excluded Croatia and Malta due to the small number of observations.
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notable exceptions representing wide deviations between EU funding and 
national funding such as Poland or Bulgaria.
While no comprehensive explanation of such heterogeneous effect can be 
offered here due to lack of space, it is suggested that regions with higher levels 
of corruption risks in general are also less able to control the additional corrup-
tion risks attached to EU Funds (for example, additional discretionary spending). 
Plotting the CRI difference between EU-funded and nationally funded contracts 
on matched samples and the unmatched mean total CRI at the regional level 
(Figure 13.4) suggests that the increase of the general level of corruption in a 
region increases the relative underperformance of EU Funds; that is, corruption 
risks in EU Funds increase further compared to national funds.
Conclusions
While much additional work is needed, this chapter has already demonstrated 
that it is feasible and fruitful to use detailed, contract-level data for tracking cor-
ruption risks over time across EU countries. Such monitoring can be done in real 
time if the necessary investment into database development is made. Findings 
indicate that EU funding increases corruption risks in some EU member states 
albeit not in others, while on average having a negative effect across the EU. 
This effect is particularly large where general corruption risks in the region are 
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Figure 13.4  Scatter plot of the CRI difference between EU-funded and nationally funded 
contracts and the mean total regional CRI, by NUTS2 regions that awarded 
at least 200 EU-funded contracts in the 2009–14 period.
Source: TED.
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high. Relative prices in EU-funded contract awards (the ratio of actual contract 
value to initially estimated contract value) (Coviello and Mariniello, 2014) are 
also higher than nationally funded ones on the matched samples (price increase 
of 0.4 per cent), which implies that approximately €9.9 billion of EU taxpay-
ers’ money is lost per annum. When interpreting the results, it is worth keeping 
in mind that corruption is a diverse phenomenon that could only partially be 
captured with the selected ‘red flags’. Further work should use more precise 
measurement based on richer data.
Appendix
Table 13.A1  Use of EU Funds in the EU27, for markets that awarded at least ten 
contracts worth above €125,000 in the 2009–14 period.
Country N of contracts 
awarded
% of contracts 
funded by the EU
% of spending through 
EU-funded public procurement
AT 13,147  1.4% 1.6%
BE 24,901  7.8% 18.2%
BG 33,023  6.8% 33.9%
CY 4,465  4.7% 8.3%
CZ 27,432  38.8% 18.5%
DE 138,477  5.0% 7.6%
DK 22,553  0.8% 1.4%
EE 7,308  21.9% 14.6%
ES 69,022  13.8% 16.3%
FI 8,729  8.8% 11.0%
FR 391,673  4.9% 9.4%
GR 12,963  29.8% 64.5%
HR 4,056  0.6% 0.3%
HU 28,111  21.8% 62.8%
IE 4,338  8.0% 15.7%
IT 74,579  2.8% 4.6%
LT 32,902  11.7% 5.7%
LU 2,264  9.4% 91.0%
LV 56,036  20.1% 38.8%
NL 22,146  3.5% 1.8%
PL 523,797  8.8% 28.1%
PT 6,145  28.4% 54.7%
RO 86,602  3.8% 29.2%
SE 27,235  1.2% 3.1%
SI 29,707  3.9% 35.3%
SK 12,902  13.1% 38.5%
UK 105,389  5.0% 2.0%
Total 1,769,902  8.0% 14.0%
Source: TED.
Table 13.A2  Summary of balance in the unmatched and the two matched samples (using 
Stata 12.0 ps test command).
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p > chi2 MeanBias MedBias B R %Var
Unmatched 0.396 391175 0.000 11.0 7.6 186.5* 1.59 99
Propensity 
score-
matching 
(cross-
country)
0.070  25682 0.000  5.3 3.3  64.1* 1.83 95
Propensity 
score-
matching 
(within-
country)
0.110  40114 0.000  5.6 3.0  82.0* 1.38 98
Source: TED.
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Figure 13.A1  Overview of bias remaining after matching per variable, propensity score-
matching (cross-country).
Source: TED.
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Figure 13.A2  Overview of bias remaining after matching per variable, propensity score-
matching (within-country).
Source: TED.
Notes
1 Malta is too small a country with small public procurement markets, making it unsuit-
able for the corruption risk measurement methodology.
2 For full list of variables available see: http://digiwhist.eu/publications/towards-a- 
comprehensive-mapping-of-information-on-public-procurement-tendering-and-its-
actors-across-europe/.
3 CPV = Common Procurement Vocabulary. For more information, see http://simap.ted.
europa.eu/en/web/simap/cpv.
4 NUTS = nomenclature of territorial units for statistics. For more information, see http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/overview.
5 Croatia is excluded from the matched comparisons as it didn’t have a sufficient pool of 
non-EU-funded project to generate a sufficient quality matching.
6 Croatia is excluded from the matched comparisons as it didn’t have a sufficient pool of 
non-EU-funded project to generate a sufficient quality matching.
7 We used the Stata 12.0 psmatch2 algorithm.
8 Coarsened exact matching was also conducted, leading to a much tighter matching at the 
expense of discarding most of the EU-funded contracts due to lack of sufficient matches. 
By implication, the resulting sample was not reliable enough to characterise the whole 
of the EU anymore. Detailed results can be obtained from the authors.
9 The EU28 minus Malta and Croatia.
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